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RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER.

Edited by James E. Wood, Jr. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press,
1985. Pp. 596. $32.50. ISBN: 0-918954-29-0.
In its selection and spectrum of essays, Religion and the State:
Essays in Honor of Leo Pfeffer pays tribute to Leo Pfeffer, activist,
author, advocate, and teacher. Like Pfeffer, the editor of these essays,
James Wood, Jr., is an avid student of church-state relations, and thus
the Pfeffer Festschrift reflects both the particular interests of the
scholar honored by this collection and the principal current debates
concerning church-state relations.
In a country where constitutional law in great part is shaped by
private parties, Leo Pfeffer is without a doubt the leading architect of
our church-state relations. For a modest account of his contribution,
one might begin reading this volume in the final section, which includes Pfeffer's autobiographical sketch and a compilation of his work
by his wife and lifelong collaborator, Freda. Pfeffer is perhaps best
known for his leading role as an advocate for separation of church
and state in the landmark challenges to government sponsored school
prayer, Bible reading, and religious instruction in the public schools,
and in the battle against state aid for parochial schools throughout the
1960s and 1970s. But a reading of Pfeffer's autobiography reveals
what is less widely known. A rabbi's son, Yeshiva graduate, congregation-member, Leo Pfeffer is an ardent separationist and an equally
avid advocate for the free exercise rights of religious observers. Long
before he became staff counsel at American Jewish Congress, Pfeffer
challenged New York's Sunday blue laws on behalf of a group of observant Jews.
It is Pfeffer's fierce dedication to religious liberty that connects
his separationist positions with his traditional background. And to
the extent that Pfeffer carries his Orthodox Jewish tradition into his
advocacy, he persuasively demonstrates the possibility for expression
of religious values in public forums. For example, in an amicus brief
on behalf of the Synagogue Council in the landmark public school
case, McCollum v Board ofEducation,' Pfeffer grounded his argument
on the need for religious freedom for school children of all faiths.
Long before the Supreme Court declared that all devotional reading
1. 333 US 203 (1948).
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of the Bible in public schools is unconstitutional,2 Pfeffer, representing
a coalition of Catholics and Jews, relied on Old and New Testament
sources to challenge the choice of the King James edition and to show
the problems inherent in government sponsorship of Bible reading. In
the abortion area, Pfeffer filed briefs for a religious coalition and once
again grounded his arguments on principles of religious freedom. In
opposing the death penalty before the U.S. Supreme Court, Pfeffer's
friend-of-the-court brief relied on standards derived from Jewish law.
As a committed Jew and separationist, perhaps Leo Pfeffer's
most significant contribution to American church-state relations has
been his ability to persuade the Court of the ways in which religion is
special, and warrants special constitutional standards. The essays collected in Religion and the State reflect this theme both in the United
States and abroad.
The largest section of this volume addresses the origins of our
American church-state relations. Of the five historical essays, three
concern the original understandings about religious liberty, and two
address more recent church-state controversies. David Little contributes a particularly interesting essay on Roger Williams that sets out to
elucidate the paradox of Roger Williams, which is to some extent also
the paradox of Leo Pfeffer, that of the religiously committed separationist. It brings to light historical sources which in addition to showing Williams' unquestioned concern for religious liberties, also reflect
a less known but equally weighty concern for the vitality of the state.
For Williams, the spiritual and the secular were radically different
realms necessitating a sharp separation between religious liberty and
state power.
In his effort to explain the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, Leonard Levy, a separationist historian, pulls together useful research concerning the state practices at
the time of the ratification of the Constitution. It is Levy's thesis that
the existence of numerous simultaneous or "multiple establishments"
in the states demonstrates that the original understanding of the Establishment Clause encompassed not merely a bar on aid to exclusive
establishments, but also a prohibition of multiple establishments.
Levy takes this argument even further in his recent book,3 where he
argues that the "multiple establishments" imply the founders' famili2.
Vitale,
3.
millan,

Abington Township School District v Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963); see also Engel v
370 US 421 (1962) (banning recitation of State-composed prayer in public schools).
Leonard Levy, The Establishment Clause. Religion and the First Amendment, (Mac1986). See my review essay of this volume, OriginalIntent, History and Levy's Estab-
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arity with, and opposition to, today's concept of nonpreferential aid.
Levy has set out to respond to current challenges by a group of intentionalist historians supporting aid to religion. But Levy's historical
analogue equating the states' multiple establishments with our modem notion of nonpreferential aid is flawed, and ultimately reflects an
important historical inquiry derailed by a contemporary debate.
Leo Pfeffer's essay, "The Deity in American Constitutional History," highlights the blurry line between the relation of church to
state and the relation of religion to politics. Leo writes compellingly
of an implicit tension. On the one hand, it seems permissible to invoke the deities generally as part of the many acknowledgements of
our religiosity as a people in political and legal discourse. On the
other hand, it is clearly prohibited - both by the Religious Test provision of Article VI of the Constitution and by the First Amendment
Establishment Clause - to require a formal invocation of the deities
as a condition for public office-holding. At some level the tension that
Pfeffer delineates is the delicate equipoise between the protection of
separation of church and state and the legitimate expression of religion in politics.
The middle section of the volume addresses a number of specific
problem areas in church-state relations: rights of association, rights
for newer religions, religion and the military, religion and public education, and church taxation issues. Kent Greenawalt contributes a
very thoughtful essay on conscientious objection. Greenawalt's approach is unusual in that he does not begin by adopting the viewpoint
of the religious believer, but instead by assuming the perspective of
the state, and questioning governmental justifications for denials of
exemptions on grounds of conscientious objection. Greenawalt's essay provides useful analytical categories to distinguish those laws
which lend themselves to exemptions on religious grounds. Laws
which implicate "the rights of others," Greenawalt maintains, are the
least suitable for exemptions. There are two problems with Greenawalt's conclusion. First, Greenawalt makes no distinction among
rights. Second, his generic category, "the rights of others" is so potentially expansive that it could include governmental and corporate
property rights. Recent Supreme Court decisions denying exemptions
to religious adherents have relied precisely on this sort of justification
that individual citizens "cannot tell the government how to run its
-

lishment Clause, 15 Law & Social Inquiry 591 (1991), and the review by Douglas Laycock, 4 J
Law & Relig 421 (1986).
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programs." 4
Next, Greenawalt looks to "paternalistic legislation," laws protecting against harm to oneself. Because these are arguably opposed
by a majority of the population, Greenawalt maintains that the granting of any exemptions whatsoever undermines these laws. This conclusion is troublesome. The problem may be one of characterization.
What sort of laws is Greenawalt thinking about? Does he mean laws
against suicide, or would Sunday observance laws also be considered
paternalistic? It seems to me the justification for denial of exemptions
across the board of paternalistic laws needs to be reanalyzed. Other
types of laws such as those imposing "shared responsibilities," Greenawalt suggests, do lend themselves to exemptions on religious
grounds; but here the objections have been on grounds of fairness. To
meet these objections, Greenawalt proposes an "alternative burdens"
approach which would require conscientious objectors to bear burdens equal to persons who do comply with the rules.
The section of the volume dealing with public education includes
articles by Norman Redlich and David Fellman. Redlich's essay,
"Religion and Schools: The New Political Establishment," surveys
recent decisions concerning the disputes over public school prayer,
Bible clubs, moments of silence, and aid to private religious schools.
For many years, Redlich collaborated with Pfeffer at the American
Jewish Congress; like Pfeffer, Redlich is a staunch absolutist on the
separation of church and state. In this chapter, Redlich persuasively
argues that recent challenges to the curriculum in the public schools,
to the media and to contemporary mores generally, reflect widespread
and mounting opposition to the separationist principle.
In juxtaposition to Redlich's essay, David Fellman's essay,
"Religion, the State and the Public University" neatly illustrates the
bright lines between the standards governing church-state issues in
the elementary and secondary schools, and the principles applicable in
higher education. In the university, religion is treated more like other
subject matters. Prayer clubs, found impermissible in the secondary
school, have been allowed and even required as a matter of First
Amendment speech rights in the universities. Similarly, financial government aid barred to parochial schools has been allowed to private
universities with religious components. Even religion-related curriculum has been permitted in the public universities.
Part Seven explores the problems of taxation of religious organi4. See, e.g., Bowen Y Roy, 476 US 693 (1986).
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zations. Dean Kelley's essay, "Tax Exemption and the Free Exercise
of Religion," presents two conflicting theories regarding the exemption of religious organizations from taxation. Under the "tax-base
theory," churches are tax-exempt because they are treated just like
other non-income producing corporations, and are simply not
counted in the tax base. Under the "tax-expenditure" or "quid-proquo" theory, tax exemptions to religious organizations are equated
with exemptions to non-profits generally, where they are justified as a
return for the services they provide to government. One problem with
the quid-pro-quo theory is that it raises (or begs) the threshold question of the nature of the services provided to government by the
churches. This question is crucial since, under the First Amendment
Establishment Clause, government is expressly forbidden from engaging in religious activities. Neither of the theories Kelley discusses account for how religious organizations differ from other non-profits in
their organization and under the Constitution. Nor do they explain
the special problems posed by the taxation, or the exemption, of religious organizations. The reader is left with an excellent overview
about the complex relationship between churches, government, and
taxation.
The last two sections of this volume deal with the broader themes
of religion and politics, and a comparative look at other models of
church-state relations. With the persistent and growing call for
greater integration of religious values in public life, the exploration of
the relationship between religion and politics is an important section
of Religion and the State. But the two essays selected, though topical,
are ultimately disappointing, particularly in light of the volume of
other recent writing in this area. "Religious Liberty, the Free
Churches, and Political Action," by Franklin H. Littell, sets out to
provide a history of the relationship of religion to politics in the
United States and in other countries. That the problems in this area
are longstanding ones is evidenced by the founders' enactment of laws
disqualifying ministers from public office, and other indications of
their deep fears of religious participation in politics. But throughout
the essay it is difficult to know if Littell is being descriptive or normative and this is a pity, given the importance of the questions. If Littell
is advocating that the present situation in the U.S. is the best of all
possible worlds for religious liberty, he has not succeeded. This essay
does not well describe the depth of the call for the greater interaction
between religion and politics, nor on the other hand, does it address
the problems presented by the association of religion with power.
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Richard V. Pierard's essay, "Religion and the New Right in the
1980s," is a descriptive piece on the development of the "new Christian right." While Pierard provides a very good compilation of the
leading actors and events of the last ten years in the Christian right
movement, to the extent that his essay offers a challenge to the activities of the Christian right, it is not sensitive to the difficulties
presented for a great number of religions in separating questions of
theology from social action.
Leo Pfeffer long recognized that "the greatest single contribution
made by American to contemporary civilization is the evolution and
successful launching of the uniquely American experiment of religious freedom and the separation of church and state." The uniqueness of the American model of church-state relations is most readily
appreciated in a comparative analysis. This is exactly what is undertaken in the section of the volume dealing with religion and world
order. Samuel Krislov's "Alternatives to Separation of Church and
State in Countries Outside of the United States," sets out to canvass
the interactions between religion and state throughout the world. The
goal is simply too ambitious; a chapter of this size cannot be comprehensive. More problematic is the lack of useful models for describing
the possible relationships between the state and church, mosque, or
synagogue. To say that demographics affects the relation of religion
to politics seems self-evident, yet this is the type of analysis Krislov
proposes.
The second essay is "The UN Declaration on the Elimination of
Religious Intolerance and Discrimination: Historical and Legal Perspectives," by Sidney Liskofsky. Liskofsky's essay is a fascinating account of the process over a thirty year period in the United Nation's
General Assembly, which culminated in the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief on November 25, 1981. It also
provides us with an important record of the history of international
accords and conventions on the subject of religion. The fundamental
question for the United Nations, as it has been in the United States, is
what standards ought govern religious discrimination. For example,
should the treatment be comparable to discrimination on the basis of
race? On this point, the Declaration is as interesting for what is included as for what is omitted. Liskofsky offers a comparative perspective of areas where a religious consensus exists, but also those
areas where there are differences, and consensus unattainable.
The Declaration provides a much more detailed articulation of
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religious liberty than can be found in our First Amendment. This is
necessary given the absence of an interpretative body like our
Supreme Court at the international level. Article Six, largely a result
of American drafting efforts, is the centerpiece of the Declaration.
Best considered under the rubric of protection of free exercise, Article
Six protects nine religious freedoms: the rights to worship, to congregate, to establish religious institutions, to use religious articles, to disseminate religious publications, to teach religion, to solicit and receive
funding, to train and appoint religious leaders, to observe religious
holidays, and last, the freedom to communicate on religious matters.
A revealing indication of the diversity in church-state models
around the world are the freedoms left out of the Declaration because
of the lack of consensus. These include the freedoms to make pilgrimages, to study sacred languages, to be married, divorced, and buried according to the dictates of one's religion, and the freedom to be
free from coercion in religious ceremonies or religious oath-taking.
Another area conspicuously absent from the Declaration is the relationship of religion to politics. The freedom "to express the implications of one's religion or belief in public life" was promoted by the
Vatican and the World Council of Churches, but did not gather a
consensus.
After a thirty year wait, perhaps the Declaration should have
been delayed even further. Given the new directions in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, one wonders how the Declaration
would look if hammered out today. In the current spirit of change,
one would want to see an updated comparative analysis soon, particularly regarding the role of religious affiliation and identity in defining
the face of Europe and the Soviet Union today.
Religion and the State is strongly recommended for any serious
scholar of the area of church-state relations. First and foremost, this
volume is valuable for its biographical and autobiographical material
on Leo Pfeffer. Further, the book brings together a useful compendium of essays on the intent of the founders on contemporary church
and state debates. It also provides helpful histories of the case law in
a variety of thorny problem areas concerning conflicts between government interests, church autonomy, and individual religious freedom. Last, with the growing interest in the relationship of religion
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and politics, Religion and the State offers a glimpse of the future debates in this often stormy and polemical area.
Ruti G. Teitel
Associate Professor of Law
New York Law School
New York, NY 10013

